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ABSTRACT 
Being touted as the biggest scandal in terms of value, the Parmalat scandal offers a good opportunity to investigate and 
analyze the role of corporate governance in the failure of corporations particularly in the United States, Europe, as well as 
in emerging economies. This paper examines Parmalat’s history and describes the circumstances that led to the massive 
accounting fraud and collapse of Europe’s and indeed one of the world’s leading dairy producers. This paper highlights 
and points out how weak and ineffective corporate governance structure and process heavily contributed to other 
problems within Parmalat and eventually led to its demise in the fall of 2003. This paper incorporates various studies 
conducted in the past on corporate governance and corporate failure. Organizations with strong and effective corporate 
governance structure and processes demonstrate better performance in all areas than those with weak corporate 
governance processes. 
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1.INTRODUCTION  
The Parmalat scandal remains on the biggest corporate scandals to have happened over the last 15 years. Indeed, no 
other than the United States Security Exchange Commission (SEC) described the scandal as ―one of the largest and most 
brazen corporate financial frauds in history (SEC, 2003).‖ Jones (2011) also stated that Parmalat was a typical example of 
accounting fraud that had taken place in the modern day Italy, perpetuated by a weak corporate governance structure and 
process, failure to exercise due professional care by the auditors, as well as greed y the founder and top management 
team. The governance structure at Parmalat was so weak, with a controlling shareholder who simply took advantage of 
this weakness and used it to further his own personal benefit instead of furthering Parmalat’s interests (Ferrarini & Giudici, 
2005). With the collapse of Parmalat which caused ripples in the financial circles across the world, and in Italy in particular, 
the role of corporate governance has been constantly put under scrutiny in Italy as well as across the globe. For instance, 
in order to respond to critics and analysts, ensure Europe’s corporate requirements are adhered to and investor 
confidence is restored, Italy passed legislation that is geared towards reforming the corporate environment, with regulatory 
agencies gaining more enforcement powers including powers to carry out investigation and to sanction rogue corporations 
(PR Newswire, 2006). This is aimed to ensure corporations play by the required laws, prevent a scandal such as 
Parmalat’s and enhance deterrence. Jones (2011) further points out that what happened at Parmalat was deliberate and 
blatant misstatement of information with the intention to deceive. This was done under the Chair and CEO in collaboration 
with the CFO. No organization whatever its size, or the industry in which it operates or how qualified its management is, 
can survive without three very strong pillars: (1) a strong and effective governance structure and process; (2) a robust and 
sustained ethical climate; and (3) effective internal control system built upon a sound control environment. It is almost not 
possible to have a robust ethical climate and an effective internal control system without an effective, well thought out and 
strong governance structure and process that is functional at all levels of the organization. At the core of this is tone at the 
top, which is basically the attitude and actions of the management and those charged with governance within an 
organization towards such things as ethics and controls and how they view this in their daily activities. When the 
governance process within a corporation is weak, compromised or abused, then the organization however strong it is, 
remains exposed to management excesses, poor oversight and in extreme cases such as Parmalat’s, collapse. Over the 
last 20 years for instance, cases of corporate failure have been devastating world over with many of these pointing various 
reasons ranging from rogue management, accounting fraud, weak internal control system, complicity by auditors, lack of 
effective oversight by regulators, among others, which all point to problems in governance structure and process. Arjoon 
(2005) supports this assertion by alluding that many of the examples of corporate failure have been attributed to various 
reasons including questionable accounting practices, abuse of power, insider trading, fraud, corruption and bribery, 
improper investment practices, pursuit of short term profits at the expense of protecting shareholder interest, weak control 
environment as well as management incompetence. All these rest on the pillar of governance and more often, a weakness 
in governance is normally the cause of these. Indeed, corporate failures have led to loss of investment and many have 
suffered with some losing their lives due to deterioration of health as a result of depression. Jobs have been lost and lives 
shattered by the greed exhibited by rogue corporate executives such as was the case in the likes of Enron, WorldCom, in 
the US, Northern Rock and Royal Bank of Scotland in the United Kingdom, other corporations in India, China, and Sub-
Saharan Africa as well as Parmalat which is the focus of this paper, among others.  In the case of Parmalat, Calisto Tanzi, 
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the founder and CEO of Parmalat had sustained greed and unethical behavior that included diverting Parmalat’s funds to 
a corporation associated with his daughter, Francesca Tanzi. ―New detention in Parmalat probe‖ (2004) reported that 
Tanzi siphoned about €500 million to Permatour, the company that his daughter worked for and managed. Scott and Davis 
(2007), point out that, key officials of organizations should be appointed in a way that ensures they are free from being 
influenced by social affiliations. They further argue that kinship and family roles may breed conflict, erode focused decision 
making and impact behavior patterns to the detriment of the organization. This is exactly demonstrated in the actions of 
Tanzi and his family.  In this paper, I will discuss in details how corporate governance plays a role in the performance of 
organizations and how corporate failures in the past and recent times have been perpetuated by weak governance 
structures and processes mixed with greed and unethical practices. I will highlight how blatant disregard of sound 
corporate governance processes contributed to the collapse of Parmalat and the steps corporations need to take to avoid 
a similar downfall and enhance their governance processes by increasing accountability among its executives, sustaining 
trust, insisting on robust ethical climate and culture as well as strengthening their control environment and compliance 
mechanisms. I will also briefly trace Parmalat’s history from its upsurge in the mid to late 20
th
 Century to its collapse in 
December 2003. I will further describe the circumstances that led to the collapse and the role of key players. I will 
demonstrate how the collapse of Parmalat was as a result of a weak, compromised and ineffective governance process 
sustained by a rogue founder with no conscience for ethics and sound principles of good and effective governance. I will 
also discuss briefly about corporate governance in emerging economies and the corporate governance lessons that 
players in the emerging economies can learn from the Parmalat scandal. This will lead to a final section where I will 
provide recommendations that corporations in the United States and globally should put in place to ensure strong 
governance structures and processes that will help set a foundation for success in every area of their operations and 
reduce exposure to the consequence suffered by other collapsed corporations, with specific focus on Parmalat.  
1.PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
O’Shea (2005) observes that there are six globally acknowledged principles of effective governance. These principles are; 
(1) a balance of functions and responsibilities of executive and non-executive directors; (2) a clear division of 
responsibilities between the chair of the board and the chief executive officer (CEO); (3) provision of timely, accurate and 
complete information to the board; (4) formal, transparent and clear procedures for the appointment of new directors and 
accountability to shareholders; (5) balanced and understandable financial reporting structure and procedures; and (6) 
maintenance of a sound, robust and effective internal control system. These principles are consistent with the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s recently updated principles for corporate governance 
by the G-20 and OECD member countries. OECD’s principles include; (1) ensuring an effective framework for corporate 
governance; (2) respecting and affirming the rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and key ownership functions; 
(3) developing sound economic policies with a particular focus on institutional investors; (4) encouraging co-operation 
between a corporation and its stakeholders; (5) sustaining a culture of disclosure and transparency by ensuring timeliness, 
accuracy and completeness of information provided to all stakeholders; and (6) defining and clearly providing guidance to 
the board on its responsibility and oversight over management of key activities of the corporation (OECD, 2015). 
Regardless of the size and type of organization and industry, the principles of governance apply to all organizations and 
are also critical to sustaining the integrity of an organization and its officials. Parmalat’s management failed to articulate 
these principles and incorporate them into its operating environment, setting the stage for what became the biggest 
corporate failure in modern times. 
1.HISTORY OF PARMALAT AND ITS COLLAPSE 
Calisto Tanzi entered the milk Market in the nineteen sixties, capitalizing on the continuous packaging process developed 
by Tetra Pak and thus Parmalat began its expansion into the dairy sector. Parmalat brand became popular in the 
seventies because of the fact that it sponsored sports, thus enabling it to venture into the Latin American markets 
(Ferrarini and Giudici, 2005). Segato (2006) points out that in 1997 Parmalat made the decision to become a ―global 
player‖ and began a major campaign of international acquisitions, in the Northern and Latin American markets mainly 
financed through debt. Within a very short time, Parmalat had become the third largest manufacturer of cookies in the 
United States alone. Ferrarini and Giudici (2005) further point out that through the influence of politicians, Mr. Tanzi 
ventured into Media and started Odeon TV which went through financial turmoil eventually becoming bankrupt in 1989. 
This forced Mr. Tanzi to pay huge debts on behalf of Odeon TV which he had personally guaranteed. Interestingly, it was 
eventually discovered during the criminal investigations following Parmalat’s collapse, that these debts were actually 
settled by funds provided by Parmalat. Through a complicated financial transaction, the Tanzi family’s company that was 
holding Parmalat’s shares, Coloniale, used its controlling strength as consideration that did not involve cash, to raise 
capital of Finanziaria Centro Nord, a public company that later became Parmalat Finanziaria (Ferrarini and Giudici, 2005). 
This resulted in a complex structure for the group that was difficult to understand. Melis (2005) provides an account of the 
complexity of Parmalat’s group structure indicating that, despite laws governing disclosure, the group’s structure was 
difficult to trace especially at a global level. In order to sustain a strong governance process, a corporation’s ownership 
structure should be easy to understand and to trace otherwise, a strong shareholder could exploit this to perpetuate fraud, 
conceal illegalities and oppress minority shareholders.  See Figure 1 for a simplified ownership structure of the Parmalat 
Group. Melis (2005) stresses that the main corporate governance problem in Italy was weak and incompetent managers; 
strong block holders; and unprotected minority shareholders. Parmalat’s case demonstrates a situation where Tanzi 
exploited the week and ineffective governance structure and processes to siphon corporate funds and channel themto 
himself and his kin in a scandal that is billed to have been one of the biggest scandals world over. 
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Figure 1: Parmalat’s Ownership Structure a Simplified Version 
Parmalat continued its expansion spree largely financed by debt and in the 1990s diversified into football, acquiring Parma 
Calcio (Parma’s Soccer club) in Italy, Palmerias, a club in Brazil and Audax Italiano, a club in Chile. Mr. Tanzi’s son, 
Stefano, became the President of Parma in 1996. Mr. Tanzi also ventured into tourism industry and through numerous 
acquisitions comprised of complex transactions, HIT, the tourism corporation of the Tanzi family hit turnover of Euros 550 
million, generating massive losses and huge debts. Tanzi’s daughter, Stefania, was in charge of the tourism business. At 
the end of 1990s Parmalat was still on an expansion spree, buying approximately two dozen companies within two years 
(1998 to 2000) (Ferrarini and Giudici, 2005). This trend continued into the new millennium with the Parmalat group 
sustaining a strategy of holding huge cash reserves to be used in mergers and acquisitions and at the same time financing 
its cash needs through bonds, with little accountability to stakeholders.   In reviewing the history of Parmalat and the 
activities of Calisto Tanzi and his family, it is clear that Tanzi had little regard for corporate governance and his actions led 
to erosion of governance principles and eventually collapse of Parmalat. 
Ferrarini and Giudici (2005), lay out the circumstances surrounding Parmalat’s collapse in a very clear way. They indicate 
that Parmalat’s financial statements were showing high levels of cash and debt, with the management led by Tanzi being 
murky and arrogant towards analysts, investors and other stakeholders just as was the situation with Enron. In October 
2002 Parmalat group launched a bond of €150 million with UBM and Banca Akros acting as underwriters and issued 
another bond worth €200 million with Morgan Stanley acting as the sole underwriter. Analysts became wary of Parmalat’s 
borrowing and argued that the debt financing posed a higher risk particularly with the unstable environment in the South 
America market and suggested that Parmalat’s management should accurately and competently assess this, in addition to 
having no intention to use its €3.3 billion cash quantity. However, Parmalat’s management was not approachable and 
analysts’ reports showed that the group’s management’s arrogance had become a common issue (Ferrarini and Giudici, 
2005). 
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―How Parmalat went sour‖ (2004) reported that Parmalat defaulted on a $185 million bond payment in mid-November 
2002. This prompted auditors and banks to scrutinize the group’s financial statements. This scrutiny revealed that some 
38% of Parmalat's assets were supposedly held in a $4.9 billion Bank of America account of a Parmalat subsidiary in the 
Cayman Islands. But on Dec. 19, 2002, Bank of America reported that no such account existed. In the ensuing 
investigation, Italian prosecutors said they had discovered that management simply invented assets to offset as much as 
$16.2 billion in liabilities and falsified accounts over a 15-year period, forcing the $9.2 billion company into bankruptcy on 
Dec. 27. Trading in Parmalat shares was suspended the same day. Auditors first inquired about the Cayman Islands 
account in December, 2002, and received a letter on Bank of America stationery in March, 2003, confirming the existence 
of the account. The letter was apparently a forgery, concocted by someone in Parmalat's Collecchio headquarters. The 
very size of the alleged account should have raised a red flag, notes the CEO of one of Italy's largest banks: "Even a $1 
million bank account is cross-verified by our auditors." Investigators also believe that in 2003 Parmalat did not buy back 
$3.6 billion in outstanding bonds, although it claimed to have done so. 
In April 2003 Mr. Tanzi had announced the resignation of Parmalat’s group CFO, Mr. Tonna who was replaced by Mr. 
Ferraris. Additionally, Parmalat’s management’s arrogance and lack of corporation was reported to Consob, the Italian 
regulator who directed, Parmalat to be more cooperative. The auditors informed stakeholders that they could not give an 
opinion on Parmalat’s financial statements as a result of complex financial transactions that were not adequately 
supported or substantiated prompting Consob to issue a letter to Parmalat management asking for more information on 
these transactions (Ferrarini and Giudici, 2005). As the financial turmoil continued to unfold, Parmalat declared its inability 
to repay one of the bonds that was maturing on December 8, 2003, forcing the bond to be downgraded to junk. Desperate 
to sell the company to American investors, Mr. Tanzi confessed in private that the company’s records were falsified 
leading to collapse of its share price and the declaration of insolvency on December 27 as reported by Bloomberg news in 
the article ―How Parmalat Went Sour.‖ As things continued to unfold, Parmalat’s management completed the destruction 
of documentation and hardware that contained evidence of fraud (Ferrarini and Giudici, 2005). Criminal investigations 
were commenced leading to Mr. Tanzi’s conviction and jailing, commencement of insolvency procedures and appointment 
of Mr. Enrico Bondi as Extraordinary Commissioner.  
As Melis (2005) points out, Parmalat’s collapse revealed features that are common to corporations that have failed before, 
such as, fraudulent financial accounting and reporting process, poor performance, political influence, greed, dominant 
shareholder, complex structures and mysterious operational processes. Key to these was Parmalat’s governance 
structures which was ineffective and grossly weakened by lack of accountability by the CEO and his management, in 
addition to governance procedures that were not properly designed or implemented. Melis further articulates additional 
serious failures in corporate governance process that resulted into Parmalat’s crisis. These are described briefly in the 
sections below. 
a) Lack of Independence of Non-executive directors 
Clearly, there was a lack of independence on the non-executive directors. As Melis (2005) points out, at least one of the 
members of the board of Parmalat had worked as a Senior Manager with the group since 1963. This shows that this 
member could easily be influenced to take biased decisions. Ferrarini and Giudici (2005) highlight that in its first 
accounting report dated 2001, Parmalat declared that four out of its thirteen directors were independent, yet never 
provided names of who these directors were. In its 2003 report, Parmalat’s eight out of thirteen directors were executive 
and they included Calisto Tanzi (Chair and CEO); Tanzi’s son Stefano; Tanzi’s brother Giovanni; nephew Paola Visconti; 
Parmalat’s CFO Fausto Tonna and the senior managers Luciano Del Soldato, Alberto Ferraris and Franseco Giuffredi. 
Board Committees were also composed of members of executive management. This demonstrates that the corporation’s 
governance structure was a mockery of an effective and strong governance process and largely unethical. 
b) Chair and CEO positions and roles were not separated.  
The positions of the Board Chair and the CEO at Parmalat were not separated. Tanzi held both positions. Proponents of 
CEO and Chair independence base their view on the need to maintain a strong governance structure that ensures 
effective checks and balances that the board, and particularly the board’s Chair, is supposed to impose on management 
led by the CEO.  Principally, a firm’s board and Chair of the board serves to hire, fire, evaluate and compensate 
management (including the CEO) based on performance.  Clearly then, these proponents argue, it is difficult to effectively 
execute the roles of both Chair and CEO under one person as has been demonstrated by the case of Parmalat. A single 
CEO and Chair cannot perform these tasks apart from his or her personal interests, making it more difficult for the board to 
perform its critical functions, if and when the CEO is its Chair.  Accordingly, separation of the Chair and CEO roles, can 
lead to better management and oversight because an independent Chair is able to ensure that the board is fully engaged 
with strategy and to evaluate how well that strategy is being implemented by management led by the CEO. Importantly, 
appointment of an independent Chair can also signal to all stakeholders that the CEO is accountable to a unified board 
with a visible leader (Bader, 2013). 
c) Disregard of compliance with Italy’s corporate governance code 
Solomon (2007) argues that according to Italy’s law, where a group of shareholders controls a company, it becomes 
extremely important that some of the directors be independent of the controlling shareholders. Parmalat did not adhere to 
this critical corporate governance piece of legislation and no explanation was given for its failure to comply with this 
legislation. At the core of a strong governance system is an effective compliance process that ensures a corporation 
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complies with the relevant rules and regulations in order to promote good governance, accountability and maintain good 
citizenship status in the environment in which it operates.  
d) Failure to implement and adequate and effective monitoring system 
Parmalat’s management failed to implement an effective monitoring system. Solomon (2007) argues that this failure by 
Parmalat to establish a careful, proper and effective checking and monitoring structures within the groups governance 
framework laid it bare to abuse of power, greed and fraudulent activity. Ferrarini and Giudici (2005) were scathing in their 
attack on the monitoring structures at Parmalat and laid the blame on the auditors, insisting that Parmalat’s successive 
auditors, Grant Thornton International and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, failed to detect fraudulent activity at Parmalat and 
that Grant Thornton’s Italian partners may have been involved in the fraud. They further point out that some high ranking 
international banks failed to conduct due diligence and warn stakeholders and the market of Parmalat’s financial distress. 
The auditors particularly overlooked the glaring governance deficiencies in Parmalat group. Not only did Parmalat execute 
a scheme of fraudulently overstating its assets while understating its liabilities through a scheme that involved activities 
such as recording non-existent repurchase of bonds, mischaracterizing of debts or simple failure to record debts. The 
entire monitoring system was rotten to the core and Parmalat’s auditors and legal advisors literally helped Parmalat’s 
management to sustain this fraud (Ferrarini and Giudici). 
1.CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 
In discussing the Parmalat’s scandal, it becomes necessary and important to discuss and evaluate the subject of 
corporate governance in emerging economies. Emerging markets play an increasingly critical role in the world economy, 
given their high economic growth prospects and their improving physical and legal infrastructures. Combined, these 
countries account for nearly 40 percent of global gross domestic product, according to the International Monetary Fund. 
For some investors, emerging markets provide an excellent and lucrative opportunity, but they also involve many sided 
risks at both the country and corporation levels. These risks require investors to have a much better understanding of the 
corporation-level governance factors in different sectors (Dallas, 2011). Several studies focusing on emerging economies 
have analyzed the impact of implementing corporate governance principles on the performance of an organization. In 
2001, Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) developed a series of corporate governance rankings for 495 corporations 
from 25 emerging countries. The report highlighted the fact that organizations that were rated high on the governance 
index have better operating performance and higher stock returns. Klapper & Love (2004, pp. 287-322) used the 
governance rankings produced by CLSA to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and organization 
performance by employing multivariate regression. Their tests showed that better corporate governance is highly 
connected with better operating performance and high market valuation. The two researchers further pointed out that well-
governed firms benefit more in environments where there is bad corporate governance and that by establishing good 
corporate governance practices, organizations can partially compensate for laws that are not working effectively and also 
enhance enforcement (Feleagă, Feleagă, Dragomir and Bigioi, 2011).  
Dallas (2011) points out that there are several factors that have proven to be essentially critical in shaping organizations’ 
governance principles and choices in the emerging economies and markets. Some of these factors include; (1) the quality 
of governance in the public sector determines the level of law enforcement which, in turn, affects the extent of bribery and 
corruption; (2) In countries where government is heavily involved in corporate ownership and control, the quality and 
competency of government officials and regulators heavily influences corporate behavior; (3) Financial market 
development is often negatively impacted by weak legal foundations, unethical practices and insider deals. For instance, 
Chase Bank in Kenya was recently placed under statutory management due to mismanagement. One of the governance 
problems that was unearthed was of one of the board members had loaned himself $79 million which is against the law 
and Central Bank of Kenya regulations (Irungu, 2016); (4) Ownership structures help determine the nature and difference 
between the board and management and performance. In many emerging economies, controlling shareholders are mostly 
family members who also occupy top management positions and succession planning is often implemented with a focus 
on family members and not on professionalism (Dallas, 2011). This resonates with the natural systems view of 
organizations whereby, though formal structures exist, they are supplemented, eroded, distorted and changed by the 
appearance of informal structures (Scott and Davis, 2007). Scott and David further point out that, informal structures are 
grounded upon personal traits and relations of the specific participants. Villalonga and Amit (2004) highlight that 
corporations controlled by family members show specific weaknesses when family members are involved in, or are 
members of the top management. A look at Parmalat shows that the management led by Mr. Tanzi used informal 
structures to run the organization where the Tanzi-family members were also members of Senior Management of the 
group. This may have led to the erosion of formal structure where clear reports structures are established and gave way to 
exploitation of the weakness brought about by the informal structure, eventually negatively impacting Parmalat’s corporate 
governance process. It is important to note that Weak and ineffective boards, that is full of family members, such as the 
Tanzi family in Parmalat is a big risk to effective governance. As a result, they fail to provide effective oversight to 
management and also to controlling shareholders and are at the mercy of these controlling shareholders. This results into 
poorly thought out strategic decision making process or as in the case of Parmalat, the controlling shareholders pursue 
their own agenda at the expense of the corporation’s objectives and thus suppress the interest of minority shareholders. 
Additionally, weak management is entrenched in the corporation because managerial positions are preserved for family 
members making it difficult to attract professional and competent talent. These weaknesses are mirrored in the Parmalat 
Scandal so clearly and are detrimental to governance process and erodes good governance process (Dallas, 2011). 
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1.RECOMMENDATION MEASURES TO ADDRESS GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS IN 
CORPORATIONS 
Corporate governance is the yardstick by which an organization’s financial, operational and compliance well-being can be 
measured. It is not some form of high level concept reserved for corporation’s boardrooms alone. As Edwards (2003) 
points out, the confidence of the mass public on a corporation is directly proportional to the effectiveness of its governance 
process. He further highlights that the run-away compensation levels of some CEOs, particularly those whose 
corporations have been performing poorly both operationally and in the stock market is just one of the aspects of 
governance that has increased public distrust in these corporations.  Even though there was no information readily 
available regarding compensation of Parmalat’s Executives, in the U.S., it is clear that CEOs compensation has continued 
to generate public debate in the wake of corporate failures that have happened in the last one and a half decades. For 
instance, Jeffrey Barbakow, CEO of Tenet Healthcare made $190 million for the fiscal year ending June 2002, at a time 
when his company’s income was being generated by a huge Medicare fraud perpetrated by Tenet Healthcare. This is just 
one of the many examples of corporate governance related problems facing organizations today.  
Complicity by the gatekeepers is another common corporate governance challenge faced by corporations, and results in 
shareholders and other investors suffering huge losses. For instance, Parmalat’s successive auditors, Grant Thornton and 
Deloitte and Touche have been accused of knowingly clearing Parmalat’s financial records when in fact they knew things 
were not right at Parmalat. According Italian regulations, corporations must change their outside auditors every nine years. 
In 1999, Parmalat changed its auditor from Grant Thornton to Deloitte and Touche. Grant Thornton convinced Parmalat to 
have its subsidiaries remain under it while the parent company be transferred to Deloitte and Touche for audit purposes. 
This way, Parmalat continued to use the subsidiaries to generate illicit payments to the parent company, whereby the 
executives at the subsidiaries would create debts owed to Parmalat by the subsidiaries and then Grant Thornton auditors 
would certify these and present them to Deloitte auditors who would just rubber-stamp them. Media was awash with 
reports that Grant Thornton accountants were aware of these shell games and shell companies, perpetuated by Parmalat 
but never raised an issue thus lending credence to the fact that they were an accomplice to Parmalat executives in 
perpetuating and sustaining these fraudulent activities (Sverige, 2004).  
To address the corporate governance challenges faced by corporations in light of the several corporate failures generally 
and Parmalat in particular, I highlight a number of initiatives and steps that can be taken by corporations and their related 
stakeholders to improve corporate governance processes, enhance corporate discipline and prevent failure that have 
impacted the likes of Parmalat, Enron, WorldCom among others. These are discussed in the below sections. 
a) Strengthening independent boards 
Board Independence is a critical component that enhances the effectiveness of corporate governance in an organization. 
Of particular importance, is ensuring that there is a balance between executive and non-executive management such that 
no single person can dominate board decisions and also accountability of management is sustained. The role of board 
Chair and CEO should as much as possible, be performed by different individuals and in the case where this is performed 
by the same individual, the control environment should be very strong and monitoring by regulators, auditors and other 
reviewers should be enhanced to ensure the Chair/CEO runs the board and the executive in a transparent and ethical 
manner. Additionally, the board should form an Audit Committee to help the board fulfill its financial reporting 
responsibilities.  
b) Sustaining enforcement through regulation and legislation 
There should be a mechanism by which enforcement is swiftly deployed when there is weak or diminished corporate 
governance process. Ensuring that regulators take action against violators of effective governance process and that the 
law swiftly takes its course. The Sarbanes-Oxley laws is one such regulation that has helped in ensuring public companies 
in the united states are managed effectively and ethically and that corporate governance practices are sustained by 
corporations’ management as well as those charged with governance. Italy has developed corporate governance 
regulations which Parmalat was required to adhere to. However, as pointed out elsewhere in this paper, Parmalat’s 
management failed to comply with it and no reason was given, and there was no evidence of enforcement by Italy’s 
government policy or regulators such as Consob. Enforcement and compliance should be embedded in an organization’s 
operation to ensure that corporate governance rules, regulations and practices are adhered to by management.  
c) Enhance monitoring and compliance 
The role of outside auditors should continue to be strengthened, broadened and governed by enforcement mechanisms. 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, limited the assurance roles that can be performed by outside auditors after the Enron and 
Arthur Andersen collapse. For Parmalat, the auditors, Grant Thornton and Deloitte, failed to exercise due professional 
care thus leading to approval of fictitious financial statements. As watchdogs particularly for the shareholders, auditors 
play an important role in enhancing corporate governance by ensuring that a corporation’s internal control and financial 
reporting process are adequate, effective and free from material misstatements. Additionally, ensuring compliance with 
relevant rules and regulations should form the core of implementing a strong governance process. The board should hold 
management accountable for compliance with relevant rules and regulations.  
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d)Code of Ethics 
Implementation of a code of ethics is critical in strengthening corporate governance process. Feleagă et al., (2011) point 
out that, in Europe 73% of companies have such as code. Arrigo (2006) also asserts that the code of ethics is indeed a 
powerful tool of corporate governance as it highlights corporate responsibilities towards stakeholders and compels 
members of the top management to comply with the relevant guidelines required of them when exercising their authority, 
both inside and outside the organization. Arrigo continues to point out that the code of ethics is one of the tools by which 
an organization can show its commitment to responsible, sustainable and respectable behavior by disseminating 
information about its own corporate governance, and meeting the stakeholders’ growing need for information. Additionally, 
the code of ethics clarifies to stakeholders the criteria that guides decision making process, as well as being a governance 
tool, it represents the company’s constitutional charter, defining the responsibilities of each member of the organization. 
1.CONCLUSION 
From the review and detailed analysis of the Parmalat scandal, it is important to conclude that a weak corporate 
governance process within Parmalat, aided by the failure of government to enforce regulations, was a major reason that 
led to the collapse of Parmalat. This study finds that a weak corporate governance structure has a strong link to corporate 
failure and that it also impacts on performance of the organizations. Further study should be carried out to determine to 
what extent corporate governance practices and processes enhance an organization’s performance in emerging 
economies in particular and how this directly relates to the organization’s value. This should also evaluate governance 
processes in various sectors such as financial services, healthcare, government, manufacturing, non-profit, educational 
institution among others. It would be particularly interesting to examine the impact of corporate governance in these 
sectors. 
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